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ZONING AMENDMENTS: THE EFFECT OF
MARYLAND'S CHANGE OR MISTAKE RULE
ON THE FAIRLY DEBATABLE STANDARD-
WHO'S GOT THE PRESUMPTIONS?
The Maryland statute enabling local authorities to pass zoning
ordinances includes a change or mistake rule that restricts amending
power to cases in which there has been a "substantial change in the
character of the neighborhood" or a "mistake in the existing zoning."'
In reviewing amendment grants, the Maryland Court of Appeals2 has
not been consistent in resolving the apparent conflict between the
presumption said to arise from the change or mistake rule and the
presumption of validity that normally attaches to legislative findings
under the "fairly debatable" standard.3 Pattey v. Board of County
1. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 4.05(a) (1970):
(a) Generally; findings for reclassification.-Such regulations, restrictions,
and boundaries may from time to time be amended .... Where the pur-
pose and effect of the proposed amendment is to change the zoning classifi-
cation, the local legislative body shall make findings of fact in each specific
case including, but not limited to, the folloing matters: population change,
availability of public facilities, present and future transportation patterns,
compatability with existing and proposed development for the area, the
recommendation of the planning commission, and the relationship of such
proposed amendment to the jurisdiction's plan; and may grant the amend-
Ment based upon a finding that there was a substantial change in the
character of the neighborhood where the property is located or that there
wa a mistake in the existing zoning classification.
(emphasis added).
2. This i, the highest court in Maryland. MD. Crs. & IUD. PW. Come Ar41.§ 1-301 (1974).
3. See MacDonald v. Board of County Cowm'rs, 238 Md. 549, 557, 210
A.2d 325, 329 (1965) (Barnes, J., d;szenting); I R. ANDEEtSON, Tm Abnmack
LAW or ZONING §§ 2.15-.16, 4.29 (1966) [hereinafter cited as AmERsoNI; 8 E.
NICQUILLIN, M1UNJCrPAL CORPORATIONS J 25.93, at 254-60 (3d ed. 1965); 1 A.
R~rs xopp, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 21-1 to -41, 27-14 to -21 (3d
ed. 1974), 21-36 to -41, 27-14 to -20 (Supp. 1973) [hereinafter cited as RATm-
Kopr). See also D. IMANDELKR, THE ZONrNG DmEmIA 86-105 (1971) [herein-
after cited as NJANDELxrR]; Arnebergh. Zoning: When Should It-And When
Afa It-Be Changed?, in INSTITUTE ON PLAwNxwo, ZomNG ANE B'uE NNT
DOTAIXN PROMEEDINGS 89 (1971); Goldman, Zoning Change: Flexibility vs.
Stability, 26 1\1. L. REv. 48 (1966); Liebmann, Maryland Zoning-The Court
and Its Critics, 27 MD. L. Rrv. 39 (1967); 13 Mv. L. REv. 242 (1953).
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Commissioners4 illustrates this conflict and one approach to its resolu-
tion.
In 1972 the Chincoteague Bay Limited Partnership petitioned the
County Commissioners to rezone 1,870 acres located on Chincoteague
Bay, directly across from Assateague Island National Seashore Park.,
The applicant sought a reclassification of agricultural and conservation
zones to high density residential, hotel-apartment, and business zones.0
After the County Planning and Zoning Commission recommended
rezoning, the County Commissioners unanimously passed an amending
ordinance.7 The Commissioners found that the requirements of the
Maryland enabling statute had been met by a showing of "substantial
change" in the neighborhood. The finding was based upon the avail-
ability of a new sewerage system, the change of Assateague Island to
a National Seashore Park, nearby road improvements, and other new
developments in the county, including a recent reclassification of 100
acres.8 Residents of Worcester County challenged the rezoning" and
appealed the circuit court decision affirming the amendment.10 The
4. 271 Md. 352, 317 A.2d 142 (1974).
5. Id. at 354, 317 A.2d at 143-44.
6. Id. at 355, 317 A.2d at 144. Land sought to be rezoned was being held by
the applicant under purchase contracts and was zoned mostly as an A-1 (agricul-
tural) district, with the portion closest to Chincoteague Bay being zoned as a C-1
(conservation) district. Id. at 354, 317 A.2d at 144.
7. Id. at 354, 317 A.2d at 145. The application was recommended for approval
subject to certain enunciated conditions which were accepted by the applicant. Id.
8. Id. at 357-58, 317 A.2d at 145.
9. While protesting adjacent landowners have no "vested right" in the original
zoning ordinance, they are entitled to rely on the enforcement of the change or
mistake rule. Compare Chayt v. Maryland Jockey Club, 179 Md. 390, 395, 18
A.2d 856, 858-59 (1941), with Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 136, 143-44, 96
A.2d 27, 30 (1953), and Northwest Merchants Terminal, Inc. v. O'Rourke, 191
Md. 171, 188, 60 A.2d 743, 751 (1948). See generally RATHKOPP, supra note
3, at 27-12 to -13 (3d ed. 1974); Gitelman, The Role of the Neighbors in
Zoning Cases, 28 ARK. L. Rxv. 221 (1975).
10. 271 Md. at 358, 317 A.2d at 146. The circuit court held that sufficient
evidence of change existed to sustain the application, relying primarily on the
availability of the new sewer system and the reclassification of Assateague Island
to a National Seashore Park. Id. The circuit court also found sufficient evidence
of mistake to justify the rezoning. The evidence of mistake initially surfaced in
this court, contrary to the general rule that the reviewing court, on appeal from
a zoning decision, "may only consider . . . evidence which is on the record."
Id. at 360, 317 A.2d at 146. Nevertheless, the Pattey court ruled on the mistake
issue and reversed the lower court on the merits. Id. at 361, 317 A.2d at 147.
For discussion of "mistake in existing zoning" see ANDSRSON, supra note 3, § 4.29.
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court of appeals reversed, holding that the evidence before the Com-
missioners was insufficient to make the question of substantial change
fairly debatable."
Restrictive zoning classifications have been upheld under the police
power providing the enactment has "substantial relation to the
health, safety, morals, or general welfare [of the community]." 12 When
the issue of validity is fairly debatable, the courts, adhering to the
separation of powers doctrine, have refused to substitute their judg-
ment for that of the local zoning authority.'3 "Fairly debatable"
means that "there is room for reasonable debate as to whether the
facts justify .. . the need for its enactment."- The effect of this
standard on an initial zoning classification places upon challengers
the burdens of producing evidence and persuading the court that the
local authority's action was arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory.' 5
Courts have also employed the fairly debatable standard in review-
ing comprehensive rezoning enactments, 6 since the power to amend
is considered correlative to the power to enact the initial regulations.-
11. 271 Md. at 366, 317 A.2d at 150.
12. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (zoning
valid under police powers).
13. Id. at 388; see, e.g., Fuller v. County Comm'rs, 214 Md. 168, 172-73, 133
A.2d 397, 399 (1957). See generally ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 2.10; Mc-
QuMLIN, supra note 3, § 25.93.
14. Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 136, 142, 96 A.2d 27, 29 (1953). See
generally ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 2.16; 7 URBAN L. ANN. 267 (1974).
15. See, e.g., Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 136, 141, 96 A.2d 27, 29 (1953)
(court's function in review of rezoning restricted by a presumption in favor of
its validity).
16. Comprehensive rezoning refers to a reclassification of an entire municipality
or a substantial part thereof. It is carried out under the authority of the municipal
legislature, rather than by the zoning commission, and is not subject to the
requirements of the change or mistake rule. See Scull v. Coleman, 251 Md. 6,
246 A.2d 223 (1968); Von Lusch v. Board of County Comm'rs, 24 Md. App.
383, 330 A.2d 738 (1975); MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(X) (1973). See
generally Carson, Reclassification, Variances, and Special Exceptions in Maryland,
21 MD. L. REv. 306, 308 (1961).
17. See, e.g., Baltimore County v. Missouri Realty, Inc., 219 Md. 155, 160-61,
148 A.2d 424, 427-28 (1959); Missouri Realty, Inc. v. Ramer, 216 Md. 442,
447, 140 A.2d 655, 657 (1958). See generally ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 4.25;
RATHKOPF, supra note 3, at 27-1 to -13 (3d ed. 1974); Bosselman, Downzoning,
32 URBAN LAND 3, 4 (1973).
The power to amend may be delegated to agencies of local government.
Baltimore County v. Missouri Realty, Inc., 219 Md. 155, 162, 148 A.2d 424,
428 (1959).
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Amendments that reclassify a single parcel of land's have been sub.
jected to a more critical standard of review in some jurisdictions. 10
The more stringent standards, based on a belief in the need for
stable land use patterns,20 frequently require that piecemeal altera-
tions be supported by a showing of public need or benefit.21
18. Amendments in these situations are often called "piecemeal rezoning."
Courts seem to be particularly suspect of "spot zoning," which is a type of
piecemeal rezoning that "puts a small area in a zone different from that of the
surrounding area .... Such zoning [is] invalid ... . [i]f it is an arbitrary and
unreasonable devotion of the small area to a use inconsistent with the uses to
which the rest of the district is restricted and made for the sole benefit of the
private interests of the owner." Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48,
57, 133 A.2d 83, 88 (1957); see, e.g., Minor v. Shifflett, 252 Md. 158, 166,
249 A.2d 159, 164, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). See generally D. f-AGAAN,
URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAw §§ 93-96 (1971).
When the zoning authorities amend the original zoning in a piecemeal fashion,
some debate has arisen over whether this is a legislative or adjudicatory activity.
The majority of cases hold it to be legislative. See, e.g., Offutt v. Board of Zoning
Appeals, 204 Md. 551, 562, 105 A.2d 219, 224 (1954). But cf. Hyson v. Mont-
gomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 217 A.2d 578 (1966); Woodlawn Area
Citizens Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 241 Md. 187, 216 A.2d 149 (1966).
In these latter cases the court of appeals has distinguished the resulting amend-
ment, which it labels legislative, from the fact-finding process that leads to its
grant, which it labels administrative or quasi-judicial. See generally Comment,
Zoning Amendments-The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Action, 33 OHIo
ST. L.J. 130 (1972); 24 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 294, 309-12 (1975).
19. Such standards have been interposed by prescribing methods for challenge,
obtaining other property owners' support for the challenge, or limiting amend-
ments to be authorized under certain circumstances. See ANDERSON, supra note
3, § 4.25. The limitations imposed when the zoning authorities seek to reclassify
property to a more restrictive use operate to protect the owner from an arbitrary
confiscatory taking. See Kracke v. Weinberg, 197 Md. 339, 79 A.2d 387 (1951);
cf. County Council v. District Land Corp., 274 Md. 691, 337 A.2d 712 (1975).
When original conditions are relaxed by the amendment, these limitations are
meant to protect neighboring landowners. "It is at least arguable, that if it is
presumed that conditions required property originally to be restricted, . . . those
same conditions existed up to the time of the amendment . . . . [so that] those
who seek to sustain the validity of the amendatory ordinance in such case, would
be required to show that the former condition no longer prevailed by introducing
evidence that there had been a change in the character of the property in-
volved . . . ." RATHKOPF, supra note 3, at 21-35 to -36 (3d ed. 1974) (emphasis
added). But see Board of Zoning Appeals v. Bailey, 216 Md. 536, 141 A.2d
502 (1958); 13 MD. L. REv. 242, 247-50 (1953). See generally 24 CATH1OLIG
U.L. REv. 294 (1975).
20. See, e.g., Ellicott v. Mayor & City Council, 180 Md. 176, 181, 23 A.2d
649, 651 (1942): "The purpose of the zoning law is, of course, to devote general
areas or districts to selected uses. 'The whole value of zoning lies in the establish-
ment of more or less permanent districts, well planned and arranged.' Rchfeld
v. City and County of San Francisco, 218 Cal. 83, 85, 21 P.2d 419, 420."
21. See, e.g., Offutt v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 204 Md. 551, 105 A.2d 219
(1954). Compare Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 136, 96 A.2d 27 (1953), with
[Vol. 10:365
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Since 1951 the Maryland Court of Appeals has used the change or
mistake rule22 as a mechanical public benefit formula to determine
the validity of piecemeal rezonings.-3 The court has stated that the
rule creates a presumption in favor of the validity of the original
zoning.*4 To overcome this presumption, an applicant must produce
sufficient evidence of change or mistake.2
When the local authority has denied rezoning, the fairly debatable
standard is used to define the applicant's burden of persuasion on
appeal.-' In this procedural setting the use of the standard is con-
sistent with the presumed validity of the original zoning. On appeal,
American Oil Co. v. Miller, 204 Md. 32, 102 A.2d 727 (1954). See generally
RATUiKoir, supra note 3, at 27-12 to -13 & n.18 (3d ed. 1974).
22. Krache v. Weinberg, 197 Md. 339, 347, 79 A.2d 387, 391 (1951). For a
history of the Maryland change or nistale rule see MacDonald v. Board of
County Cnmm'rs, 238 Md. 549, 576-77, 210 A.2d 325, 340-41 (1965) (Barnes,
J., dissenting) ; Goldman, supra note 3, at -19. For a discussion of the change or
mistake approach of other jurisdictions see 24 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 294 (1975).
23. The factors of chonge or mistake have been called:
talismanic phrases now applied with Draconian severity to rezoning efforts of
the local legislative bodies, with unfortunate results.
i[To- "mistake-chane in physical condition" rule should not be an exclusive
test. While, of course, an amendment is often predicated upon the recognition
of changing conditions or of a mistake in original zoning . . . , such factors,
while relevant, are not controlling, and are among many circumstances for
the Council to weigh and evaluate. Similarly, reviewing courts should con-
sider the presence or absence of such factors merely as some evidence tending
to shoe:, whether or not the action of the Council, in granting or denying a
prop sed reclassification, ,sas arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious. The
majority has now made the rule the exclusive test ....
MacDonald v. Board of County Comm'rs, 238 Md. 549, 577, 581, 210 A.2d 325,
341, 313 (1963) (Barnes, J., dissenting). See also ANDERSON, supra note 3,
4.29; RATHRIOPF, supra note 3, at 27-14 to -23 (3d ed. 1974), 27-14 to -22
(Supp. 1973).
24. Stratakis v. Beauchamp, 268 Md. 643, 652, 304 A.2d 244, 249 (1973).
25. See, e.g., Wclls v. Picerpont, 253 Md. 554, 253 A.2d 749 (1969). Even
when the court has found that "[i]ndvidually, some of these considerations
[of change or mistake] would not be controlling; taken together, their cumulative
ef,'at is very strong . . . ." Mayor & Council V. Cotler, 230 Md. 335, 339, 187
A.2d 91, 96 (1963) (emphasis added). See generally MANDrLKER, supra note
3, at 92-96 (analysis of results regarding planning considerations).
26. See, e.g., Valenzia v. Zoning Bd., 270 Md. 478, 312 A.2d 277 (1973);
Mayor & Council v. Itenley, 268 Md. 469, 302 A.2d 45 (1973); Cabin John,
Ltd. v. Montgomery County Council, 259 Md. 661, 271 A.2d 174 (1970);
Agneslane, Inc. v,. Lucas, 247 Md. 612. 233 A.2d 757 (1967); Park Constr. Corp.
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 245 Md. 597, 227 A.2d 15 (1967); Board of
County Comm'rs v. Farr, 242 Md. 315, 218 A.2d 923 (1966); Dobry v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 241 Md. 717, 216 A.2d 746 (1966); Pallace v. Inter City
Land Co., 239 Md. 549, 212 A.2d 262 (1965); Board of County Comm'rs v.
1975]
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both the fairly debatable standard and the presumption of validity
operate in favor of the local authority's action, since its refusal to
grant an amendment logically implies an affirmance of the existing
classifications. Applicants are rarely able to overcome the fairly de-
batable standard in this situation.27 When neighboring landowners
contest a rezoning on appeal, however, the burden of persuasion
dictated by the fairly debatable standard is in conflict with the pre-
sumed validity of the original zoning. Judicial deference to the local
authority's judgment on the reclassification under the fairly debatable
standard would theoretically place the burden of persuasion on those
challenging the grant.2s On its face, this is inconsistent with the
presumed validity of the original zoning (derived from the change
Meltzer, 239 Md. 144, 210 A.2d 505 (1965); Kaslow v. Mayor & Council, 236
Md. 159, 202 A.2d 638 (1964); Reese v. Mandel, 224 Md. 121, 167 A.2d 111(1961); Hewitt v. County Comm'rs, 220 Md. 48, 151 A.2d 144 (1959); Iverson
v. Zoning Bd., 22 Md. App. 265, 322 A.2d 569 (1974). See also note 28 infra.
27. See cases cited note 26 supra. See also Montgomery County Council v.
Scrimgeour, 211 Md. 306, 312, 127 A.2d 528, 531 (1956), quoting Mayor &
Council v. Biermann, 187 Md. 514, 523, 50 A.2d 804, 808 (1947): "[T]he
property owner has the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of con-
stitutionality of legislative action, even if the legislative body acted without
evidence at all." But see Charles J. Cirelli & Sons, Inc. v. Harford County
Council, 26 Md. App. 491, 338 A.2d 400 (1975). See also Board of County
Comm'rs v. Oak Hill Farms, Inc., 232 Md. 274, 192 A.2d 761 (1963), discussed
in Cohen, Some Aspects of Maryland Administrative Law, 24 MD. L. Rav. 1,
40-42 (1964) (special local review provision for Prince George's County).
28. In the absence of the change or mistake rule, the operation of the fairly
debatable rule logically should produce "a marked difference between the changes
which will justify a reclassification by the zoning authorities and those which
impel one." Board County Comm'rs v. Meltzer, 239 Md. 144, 155, 210 A.2d
505, 511 (1965). The reason for this is that
[ejven if there were facts which would have justified the Council in rezoning
the property, this would not of itself prove the denial of rezoning illegal.
There is still the area of debatability, and one who attacks the refusal of
rezoning must meet the heavy burden of proving that the action of the
legislative body in refusing it was arbitrary, capricious or illegal.
County Council v. Gendleman, 227 Md. 491, 498, 177 A.2d 687, 690 (1962).
In the majority of cases the court of appeals falls to differentiate between
cases in which the local authority denies the amendment and those in which it
is granted. At least one author has concluded that "[o]n balance . . . a lack of
clarity in the decisions leads us to treat both situations as the same." MANDELKER,
supra note 3, at 89. Nevertheless, when the court of appeals affirms a denial, it
has often stated or implied that cases of rezoning refusals are to be treated
differently from cases in which rezoning has been granted. Templeton v. County
Council, 21 Md. App. 636, 321 A.2d 778 (1974), held: "It is only when the
denial of the requested rezoning conflicts with constitutional provisions that the
[Vol. 10:365
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol10/iss1/16
MARYLAND'S CHANGE OR MISTAKE RULE
or mistake rule), which in theory would place the burden on the
applicant to justify the amendment on appeal.29 Three general ap-
proaches to the resolution of this apparent inconsistency can be
courts [may] interfere with that denial." Id. at 643, 321 A.2d at 782. See Messen-
ger v. Board of County Comm'rs, 259 Md. 693, 704, 271 A.2d 166, 172 (1970),
and cases cited therein. The import of such statements, as a basis to distinguish
between those situations in which rezoning is initially granted and those initially
denied, is unclear. The use of a different test when reclassification has been
granted may refer to the imposition of a presumption of validity of the original
zoning limiting the operation of the fairly debatable rule. On the other hand,
the difference referred to could be the "area of debatability" created by an
autonomous application of the fairly debatable rule. See Board of County
Comm'rs v. Meltzer, 239 Md. 144, 155, 210 A.2d 505, 511 (1965). The effect
of the court of appeals' acknowledgment of this distinction is stronger, vis-h-vis
the fairly debatable rule, when rezoning has been granted by the local authorities.
See, e.g., Stratakis v. Beauchamp, 268 Md. 643, 304 A.2d 244 (1973); Hyson
v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 217 A.2d 578 (1966); Dill v. Jobar
Corp., 242 Md. 16, 217 A.2d 564 (1966); Rohde v. County Bd. of Appeals,
234 Md. 259, 199 A.2d 216 (1964); Muhly v. County Council, 218 Md. 543,
147 A.2d 735 (1959). The Hyson court stated that "[e]vidence to justify the exper-
tise of the zoning authorities in granting reclassification does not have to be
so strong as evidence that would require rezoning." 242 Md. at 76, 217 A.2d at
591. The same conclusion is implied in Rohde when the court, in upholding a
reclassification, distinguished two cases relied upon by appellants (neighboring
property owners): "On the . . . evidence we cannot say that the action of the
Board was arbitrary or unreasonable.... The situation here presented is the re-
verse of that in the Renz and Reese cases in that here the Board has approved the
reclassification, but there it disapproved reclassification." 234 Md. at 268, 199
A.2d at 221.
29. Professor Rathkopf, in attempting to resolve the apparent inconsistency
between legislative deference to a rezoning grant and the presumed validity of
the original zoning, suggests that the court of appeals "require[s] the proponent
of the change to support it by evidence [of change or mistake] as a condition
precedent to the operation of the presumption of validity but such evidence
having been given, it would appear that the presumption then attaches with
its customary vigor." RATHKOPF, supra note 3, at 27-16 to -17 (3d ed. 1974).
Once an applicant has produced evidence of change and has convinced the
zoning authorities that the change is, in fact, sufficient, it is unclear what
degree of authority attaches to their determination on appeal. The problem
arises when the court in reviewing the evidence expands its exploration beyond
a search for sufficient evidence into a legal determination of what constitutes
"substantial change." The court's approach to the issue of what constitutes
sufficient evidence of "substantial change" is reflected by its determination of
which party must bear the burden of persuasion on appeal and by the strength
of the evidence required to overcome this burden.
In Habliston v. City of Salisbury, 258 Md. 350, 265 A.2d 885 (1970), the
court of appeals explained its position on evidence of "substantial change,"
emphasizing that the party alleging a "change in the character of the neighbor-
hood" must show "evidence of a substantial change." Id. at 363, 265 A.2d at
1975]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
developed from an analysis of the Maryland Court of Appeals' de-
cisions. 30
One line of cases, characterized by West Ridge, Inc. v. McNamara,31
stresses judicial deference to legislative judgments concerning the
891; cf. Dustin v. Mayor & Council, 23 Md. App. 389, 328 A.2d 748 (1974),
which quotes Habliston and adds: "We are rigidly limited in this appeal to a
determination whether there is any evidence tending to support the finding that
changes had occurred that altered the character of the neighborhood." Id. at 415,
328 A.2d at 764 (citations omitted). Then the court examined alleged changes
in the neighborhood based on the extension of an avenue as an industrial road.
Holding that no legally sufficient evidence existed to justify the rezoning, the
court said "that road changes, to justify a piecemeal zoning reclassification, must
destroy the strong presumption of the correctness of original zoning and constitute
strong evidence that such change has affected the character of the neighborhood."
Id. at 421, 328 A.2d at 767 (citations omitted).
30. These generalized approaches have been developed by the author and are
not meant to represent Maryland zoning law as perceived by the Maryland
courts. The lines of cases described herein have been distinguished based upon
a functional analysis of the presumption problem. The cases have been placed
within an analytical framework according to their procedural posture, the process
by which the court evaluates alleged factors of change, and the result reached
by the court as to the validity of the amending ordinance. Since the court, in
any particular case, will have chosen citations indiscriminately from any of the
three lines of cases and often from cases of rezoning denials, the court's citations
have been given little regard in this analysis.
At least two criteria have been suggested as to the court of appeals' method of
determining the proper standard from among those approaches. MANDLKER,
supra note 3, at 86-105 (planning consideration) ; Sickels, The Illusion of Judicial
Consensus: Zoning Decisions in the Maryland Court of Appeals, 59 Ams. POL.
Se. REv. 100 (1965) ("statistical" survey, concluding that result depends on
judge). But see Liebmann, supra note 3 (challenging Sickels' findings),
31. 222 Md. 448, 160 A.2d 907 (1960). The West Ridge court upheld the
reclassification of 18.5 acres from agriculture to light commercial and of six-
tenths acres to heavy commercial based on "evidence of a change in conditions
due to the substantial increase in population of the area, of the increasing com-
mercialization in the vicinity, and of the general public trend towards the use
of shopping centers . . . ." Id. at 457, 160 A.2d at 912. The court reached
its holding based on the following standard of review:
[I]n the case of piecemeal rezoning, there must be a showing of either an
error in original comprehensive zoning or such a change in conditions as to
warrant rezoning, [and] if either of these is shown, or if there are facts from
which the legislative body could reasonably have made such a finding (i.e.,
that the matter is at least fairly debatable), the courts may not interfere
with the legislative action, and that since there is a presumption in favor of
the validity of the legislative action, the burden is on those objecting to the
rezoning to show the absence of error in the original zoning and the lack of
any such change in conditions as would warrant the rezoning.
Id. at 454, 160 A.2d at 910.
[Vol, 10:365
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substantiality of the alleged changes.nz Under this approach, the
change or mistake rule does not affect the court's use of the fairly
debatable standard because "[o]nce property is reclassified by the
Council, its action is presumed to be valid, and it is incumbent upon
those who attack the same to overcome the presumption." 33 The
policy that "zoning can never be completely permanent"34 supports
placing the burden of persuasion on challengers of the reclassification.
This line of cases consistently upholds amendments. 35
Wakefield v. Kraft" is representative of a second line of cases.37 In
Wakefield the court of appeals stated that the presumption of legisla-
tive validity "applies to rezoning as well as to original zoning, though
32. See Mayor & Council v. Stone, 271 Md. 655, 319 A.2d 536 (1974);
Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 217 A.2d 578 (1966);
Overton v. Board of County Comm'rs, 225 Md. 212, 170 A.2d 172 (1961);
West Ridge, Inc. v. McNamara, 222 Md. 448, 160 A.2d 907 (1960); Pressman
v. Mayor & City Council, 222 Md. 330, 160 A.2d 379 (1960); Muhly v. County
Council, 218 Md. 543, 147 A.2d 735 (1959).
33. Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 76, 217 A.2d 578,
591 (1966).
34. Muhly v. County Council, 218 Md. 543, 547, 147 A.2d 735, 737 (1959).
Further support could be found in the neighboring landowner's lack of vested
rights in the existing classifications. See note 9 supra.
35. See cases cited note 32 supra.
36. 202 Md. 136, 96 A.2d 27 (1953). The Wakefield court felt "abundant"
facts existed before the County Commissioners that permitted them "to debate on
equal terms, at least, with anyone challenging the propriety, the fairness, and
the soundness of their conclusion that the zoning ordinance [applying to a road
intersection] should be amended [from residential to commercial]." Id. at 144,
96 A.2d at 30. Those facts included (1) planning policy allowing for rezoning
of road intersections for commercial use for the "accommodation and convenience
of the residents of the residential district;" (2) precise location of an intersection
unknown at the time of the existing ordinance enactment; (3) existence of non-
conforming business uses across the street and adjacent to the subject parcel;
(4) new roads causing increased traffic from 300% to 500%; (5) Maryland's
building of an armory on part of the original Wakefield property that "increase[d]
noise, confusion and dirt about the intersection;" and (6) a definite need for a
neighborhood shopping center (although rezoning sought to build an automobile
showroom and garage). Id. at 145-47, 96 A.2d at 30-32.
37. See Jobar Corp. v. Rodgers Forge Community Ass'n, 236 Md. 106, 202
A.2d 612 (1964); County Comm'rs v. Merryman, 222 Md. 314, 159 A.2d 854
(1960); City of Baltimore v. NAACP, 221 Md. 329, 157 A.2d 433 (1960);
Mettee v. County Comm'rs, 212 Md. 357, 129 A.2d 136 (1957); Eckes v. Board
of Zoning Appeals, 209 Md. 432, 121 A.2d 249 (1956); American Oil Co. v.
Miller, 204 Md. 32, 102 A.2d 727 (1954); Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 136, 96
A.2d 27 (1953).
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not with as great force."3s The court justifies the dilution of the pre-
sumption by recognizing "a counter-presumption that the original
zoning . . . was well planned and designed to be reasonably perma-
nent which may be overcome only by proof [of change or mistake]."30
If the court determines that neither a change nor a mistake has been
shown, "the presumption of the reasonableness of the rezoning would
be destroyed."40 Under this approach, when some showing of change
or mistake exists to support the rezoning, the cases are silent on the
issue of which party bears the burden of persuasion on appeal. Exami-
nation of the results reached in these cases demonstrates that reclassi-
fications are often affirmed despite a lessening of the presumed
legislative validity.41
Pattey v. Board of County Commissioners4 2 represents a third line
of more recent cases. 43 The Pattey court stated that the scope of
38. Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 136, 141, 96 A.2d 27, 29 (1953) (emphasis
added).
39. County Comm'rs v. Merryman, 222 Md. 314, 324, 159 A.2d 854, 860
(1960).
40. Id. Conceptually this approach differs from that taken in West Ridge in
that here the court attempts a simultaneous application of both presumptions,
which accounts for the dilution of the presumed legislative validity. Conse-
quently, a clear statement that the burden of persuasion falls on challengers,
such as that found in the West Ridge line of cases (see notes 31-33 and accom-
panying text supra) has not been made in these cases. In its review of alleged
changes under the Wakefield approach, the court focused on the presence or
absence of a public need for the change rather than on its substantiality. This
focus could be justified by the purpose of the change or mistake rule. See notes
22, 23 and accompanying text supra. Although this emphasis on public need
serves to distinguish the Wakefield approach from that taken in Pattey, the dis-
tinctions between the Wakefield line of cases and those in West Ridge are blurred
at this point. See, e.g., Rohde v. County Bd. of Appeals, 234 Md. 259, 199 A.2d
216 (1964); Bishop v. Board of County Comm'rs, 230 Md. 494, 187 A.2d 851
(1963); Fallon v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 110, 148 A.2d 709 (1959); Price
v. Cohen, 213 Md. 457, 132 A.2d 125 (1957).
41. See Jobar Corp. v. Rodgers Forge Community Ass'n, 236 Md. 106, 202
A.2d 612 (1964); Mettee v. County Comm'rs, 212 Md. 357, 129 A.2d 136
(1957); Eckes v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 209 Md. 432, 121 A.2d 249 (1956);
Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 136, 96 A.2d 27 (1953).
42. 271 Md. 352, 317 A.2d 142 (1974).
43. See Trainer v. Lipchin, 269 Md. 667, 309 A.2d 471 (1973); Stratakis
v. Beauchamp, 268 Md. 643, 304 A.2d 244 (1973); Border v. Grooms, 267 Md.
100, 297 A.2d 81 (1972); Clayman v. Prince George's County, 266 Md. 409,
292 A.2d 689 (1972); Creswell v. Baltimore Aviation Serv., Inc., 257 Md. 712,
264 A.2d 838 (1970); Wells v. Pierpont, 253 Md. 554, 253 A.2d 749 (1969);
Woodlawn Ass'n v. Board of County Conm'rs, 241 Md. 187, 216 A.2d 149
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review is "confined to a determination of whether sufficient evidence
has been presented at the zoning hearing to make the issue fairly
debatable .... "4 Nevertheless, the court maintained that attempts
to rezone are "dominated by the strong presumption of correctness
which attaches to such original zoning" and that the burden to
produce "strong" evidence of change is an "onerous" one.45 The
Pattey court placed this burden upon the applicant in an independent
review of the evidence. Under the Pattey approach, the applicant must
thus overcome the onerous burden on appeal before the court will
apply the fairly debatable standard to the findings of the zoning
authorities. As a consequence, the amendments have usually been
defeated. 4"
The Pattey court bypassed an opportunity to invalidate the amend-
ment because of the applicant's failure to delineate the perimeters of
the neighborhood in which the changes were alleged to have oc-
curred.17 It accepted a reasonable delineation arguendo to reach the
issue whether the specific changes alleged were substantial. 48  After
(1966); Mothershead v. Board of County Comm'rs, 240 Md. 365, 214 A.2d 326
(1965); Miller v. Abrahams, 239 Md. 263, 211 A.2d 309 (1965); Board of
County Comm'rs v. Kines, 239 Md. 119, 210 A.2d 367 (1965); MacDonald v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 238 Md. 549, 210 A.2d 325 (1965); Pahl v. County
Bd. of Appeals, 237 Md. 294, 206 A.2d 245 (1965); Shadynook Improvement
Ass'n v. Molloy, 232 Md. 265, 192 A.2d 502 (1963); Dustin v. Mayor & Council,
23 Md. App. 389, 328 A.2d 748 (1974).
44. 271 Md. at 360, 317 A.2d at 146.
45. Id. at 359, 317 A.2d at 146.
46. See cases cited note 43 supra.
47. 271 Md. at 361-62, 317 A.2d at 147-48. The court states that the failure
to delineate "is alone sufficient to mandate reversal." Id. at 362-63, 317 A.2d
at 148 In Iverson v. Zoning Bd., 22 Md. App. 265, 322 A.2d 569 (1974), the
court of special appeals, citing Pattey, held that the zoning board properly re-
fused to rezone when the landowner failed to delineate the neighborhood in
which changes were alleged to have occurred. Further, the Iverson court refused
to remand the case for a proper delineation, thus holding that the applicant's
procedural error was fatal. Id. at 273, 322 A.2d at 573.
48. 271 Md. at 364, 317 A.2d at 148. While change must be "substantial"
with respect to the character of the neighborhood, the Commissioners made no
finding of fact as to the proper delineation of the neighborhood in question.
Id. at 363-64, 317 A.2d at 148. The circuit court found that the entire county
is the neighborhood based upon §§ 20.11-.12 of the Worcester County Zoning
Ordinance, which provides "for map amendments in 'recognition of the fact that
sections of Worcester County are changing from a rural to a residential, com-
mercial, industrial, or other character . .. .'" 271 Md. at 362, 317 A.2d at 148.
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concluding that insufficient evidence of "substantial change" existed
to overcome the presumption of correctness attaching to the original
zoning, the court held that the issue was not fairly debatable. 49 The
court conceded that substantial change may occur when new or ex-
panded sewer facilities are built.50 It distinguished, however, the
import of the sewer expansion involved in the present case by noting
that the newly built facility was two to three miles from the subject
property and that representations concerning its availability to the
applicant were "equivocal."s' Increased development throughout
Worcester County and the change of Assateague Island to a National
Seashore Park were held to be clearly outside of the reasonably
delineated neighborhood.5 2 Further, the change to a National Sea-
shore Park was held not to affect the "character" of the subject prop-
erty.5 3 The court summarily dismissed the proposed improvements
of State Route 113 as a factor indicative of substantial change, since
there was nothing to indicate that it was unknown to the authorities
The courts of appeals' delineation "of what, at the most, could constitute
the "reasonable 'neighborhood'" was "[r]oughly .. . an area of some sixteen
square miles and would barely include the [site of the new sewer facility], some
two miles from the subject property . . . .. Id. at 363, 317 A.2d at 148. The
delineation would include the site of proposed improvements on State Route 113
and the area that was rezoned to rural residential. Id.
49. Id. at 366, 317 A.2d at 150.
50. Id. at 364, 317 A.2d at 149; see Bigenho v. Montgomery County Council,
248 Md. 386, 237 A.2d 53 (1968); Meginniss v. Trustees of the Sheppard &
Enoch Pratt Hosp., 246 Md. 704, 229 A.2d 417 (1967); Hyson v. Montgomery
County Council, 242 Md. 55, 217 A.2d 578 (1966). But of. Clayman v. Prince
George's County, 266 Md. 409, 292 A.2d 689 (1972); Chatham Corp. v. Beltram,
252 Md. 578, 251 A.2d 1 (1969); MacDonald v. Board of County Comm'rs, 238
Md. 549, 210 A.2d 325 (1965).
51. 271 Md. at 364, 317 A.2d at 149. The court of appeals refused to consider
a letter from the County Sanitary District that promised facilities would be
available to the applicant until its own could be built. The court stated that "in
our review of a zoning decision we are confined to the record before the legisla-
tive body." Id. at 365, 317 A.2d at 149.
52. Id. at 364-65, 317 A.2d at 149. Assateague Island is six miles across Chinco-
teague Bay from the subject property and 25 to 30 miles by automobile. There
are no docking facilities on the island. The rezoning of the island permanently
precluded development of an urban residential district four and one-half miles
long, two general business areas, and two hotel-apartment districts that were
contemplated by the land use map for the area. The park was geared primarily
to daytime uses. The applicant argued that a need was created for overnight
accommodations on the mainland and especially in the neighborhood of the sub-
ject property. The Commission accepted this in their findings, but the court
of appeals rejected it. Id. at 365, 317 A.2d at 149.
53. Id.
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at the time of the original zoning.54 In similar fashion, it held that
the rezoning of 100 acres within the immediate neighborhood of the
applicant's property to a less dense classification than any of those
sought by the applicant could not justify the amendment.55
The Pattey opinion, which is short and mechanical, draws much
of the support for imposing an onerous burden on the appellants
from cases in which zoning authorities initially denied rezoning appli-
cations."8 The court thus ignores the logical and occasionally stated
position that cases of rezoning grants should be treated differently
from rezoning denials. z Further, despite an ostensible acceptance of
the fairly debatable standard, the Pattey court makes no attempt to
explain how the standard relates to the onerous burden placed on the
appellants, nor does it offer citation or discussion of the Wakefield
or West Ridge lines of cases.'8
Although the judgment of the local authorities regarding the exist-
ence of substantial change seems to be at least within the realm of
reasonable debate, the Pattey court, reviewing the alleged changes,
either alters the meaning of fairly debatable or simply allows the
standard to be overpowered by the undefined but onerous burden of
persuasion. 9 By a narrow, although not unprecedented, view of the
54. Id. at 365-66, 317 A.2d at 149-50.
55. Id. at 366, 317 A.2d at 150.
56. Id. at 359, 317 A.2d at 146. The court, without independent analysis,
drew support for its stand on presumptions from five cases: Valenzia v. Zoning
Bd., 270 Md. 478, 312 A.2d 277 (1973); Trainer v. Lipchin, 269 Md. 667,
309 A.2d 471 (1973); Stratakis v. Beauchamp, 268 Md. 643, 304 A.2d 244(1973); Mayor & Council v. Henley, 268 Md. 469, 302 A.2d 45 (1973); Cabin
John, Ltd. v. Montgomery County, 259 Md. 661, 271 A.2d 174 (1970). 271 Md.
at 359, 317 A.2d at 146. Two of these cases, Trainer and Stratakis, dealt with
rezoning grants based on alleged mistakes. The other three, Valenzia, Henley and
Cabin John, were rezoning denial cases.
57. See notes 26, 28 and accompanying text supra.
58. The fairly debatable standard is given a mechanical recitation in the
Pattey decision. 271 Md. at 360, 317 A.2d at 146. The citations that follow the
statement of the standard refer to the inadmissibility of new evidence on appeal,
and no citations are given to cases that discuss the fairly debatable standard.
Id. Nevertheless, the court again pays lip service to the standard when announc-
ing its holding on the issue of alleged change. Id. at 366, 317 A.2d at 150.
59. Cf. note 14 and accompanying text supra. Justice Barnes in his dissent
in Miller v. Abrahams, 239 Md. 263, 211 A.2d 309 (1965), stated:
As all of the cases agree that both zoning and rezoning ordinances involve
the exercise of legislative power, why is it that the exercise of legislative
power at a later time does not have at least equal force or an equal presump-
tion of validity as does the prior exercise of legislative power? Apart from
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statutory language the court of appeals limits substantial change to
physical change within the immediate neighborhood.60 Such an
interpretation precludes debate on the substantiality of change on
Assateague Island or in the surrounding county, which, although
outside of the delineated neighborhood, at least arguably "affected
its character."61 Moreover, by holding that a rezoning within the
rezoning legislation, we have consistently, vigorously and, to my mind, quite
properly held that one legislative body may not prevent contrary action by
the legislative body acting at a later date, however emphatically it attempts
to do this.
Id. at 276, 211 A.2d at 316; accord, Woodlawn Area Citizens Ass'n v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 241 Md. 187, 203-13, 216 A.2d 149, 159-65 (1966)
(Barnes, J., dissenting); MacDonald v. Board of County Comm'rs, 238 Md.
549, 210 A.2d 325 (1965) (Barnes, J., dissenting); Prince George's County v.
Donohoe, 220 Md. 362, 367, 152 A.2d 555, 557 (1959); State v. Fisher, 204 Md.
307, 315, 104 A.2d 403, 406 (1954); Montgomery County Council v. Bigelow,
196 Md. 413, 423, 77 A.2d 164, 168 (1950); RATHOPF, supra note 3, at 21-38,
27-16 (3d ed. 1974).
60. 271 Md. at 363, 317 A.2d at 148. The court states that "changes must occur
in the immediate neighborhood of such a nature as to have affected its character."
Id. at 365, 317 A.2d at 149.
Justice Barnes, in his dissent to MacDonald v. Board of County Comm'rs, 238
Md. 549, 210 A.2d 325 (1965), examines
the syllogisms upon which this "change-or-mistake" rule rests. As [he]
see[s] them they are:
Major premise: The comprehensive zoning plan was a good plan when
enacted; the plan is good today, if physical conditions have not changed.
Minor premise: Physical conditions have not changed.
Conclusion: The plan is good today ....
The difficulty lies in the dependence upon the terms "good"--"bad"-
"conditions", and the interpretation to be placed on each. Or, to put the
matter a different way, the defect may lie in confining the term "conditions"
to the connotation of "physical conditions."
Id. at 578, 210 A.2d at 341 (footnotes omitted). In his analysis of the Maryland
cases, Rathkopf suggests that "the term 'changed conditions' need not relate to
actual physical conditions already present; it may relate to social or economic
conditions reasonably foreseeable and presently or potentially operating upon the
community." RATHKOPF, supra note 3, at 27-19 (3d ed. 1974).
61. The effect could have been found in terms of development, marketing
potential, and public need in the area for overnight accommodations. The circuit
court gave the following description of the developments in Worcester County:
Ocean City [north of the subject property] has developed into a high density
community, with a proliferation of low-rise, mid-rise and high-rise condo-
miniums, as well as an enormous mobile home community, designed to
answer the apparently insatiable desire of people to acquire a second home
.... [Clamp grounds and tenting areas have mushroomed, [and] [aI]long vir-
tually every road in the County, one can see a clearing for the construction
of a residence of some description.
Brief for Appellee at 25, Pattey v. Board of Comm'rs, 271 Md. 352, 317 A.2d
142 (1974).
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neighborhood to a less dense classification cannot be substantial, the
court of appeals seems to measure this term by the degree of difference
between the existing classification and that sought by the applicant,
rather than by the effects of the rezoning on the "character of the
neighborhood."62
The Pattey court dismisses in a cursory manner the substantiality
of the proposed road improvement.-- It does not mention the cases
in which such changes were held to create grounds for reasonable
debate' even when previously known to the original zoning authori-
ties, so long as the changes were "reasonably probable of fruition
in the foreseeable future 65 and would affect the character of the
62. 271 Md. at 366, 317 A.2d at 150; cf. West Ridge, Inc. v. McNamara,
222 Md. 448, 160 A.2d 907 (1960) (finding of "substantial change" justified
reclassification from agriculture to cottage residential, light industrial, and heavy
commercial classifications).
The problem with the court's analysis is that, arguably, substantial change in
the character of the neighborhood could occur by a rezoning to any classification
accompanied by subsequent development, particularly when the rezoning and
development occur in an area of 100 acres, as in the instant case. The following
cases have held that the rezoning of neighboring property could constitute
substantial change: Kirkman v. Montgomery County Council, 251 Md. 273,
247 A.2d 255 (1968); Lutherville Community Ass'n v. Wingard, 239 Md. 163,
210 A.2d 534 (1965); Board of County Comm'rs v. Oak Hill Farms, Inc., 232
Md. 274, 192 A.2d 761 (1963); Bishop v. Board of Comm'rs, 230 Md. 494,
187 A.2d 851 (1963). But cf. Board of County Comm'rs v. Kines, 239 Md. 119,
210 A.2d 367 (1965).
63. 271 Md. at 366, 317 A.2d at 150.
64. See, e.g., Ragan v. Hildeshiem, 247 Md. 609, 233 A.2d 761 (1967); Beth
Tfiloh Congregation v. Blum, 242 Md. 84, 218 A.2d 29 (1966); Finney v. Halle,
241 Md. 224, 216 A.2d 530 (1966); Jobar Corp. v. Rodgers Forge Community
Ass'n, 236 Md. 106, 202 A.2d 612 (1964); Muhly v. County Council, 218 Md.
543, 147 A.2d 735 (1958). But ef. Wells v. Pierpont, 253 Md. 554, 253 A.2d
749 (1969); Board of County Comm'rs v. Kines, 239 Md. 119, 210 A.2d 367
(1965); MacDonald v. Board of County Comm'rs, 238 Md. 549, 210 A.2d 325
(1965); Greenblatt v. Toney Schloss Properties Corp., 235 Md. 9, 200 A.2d 70
(1964).
65. See Brenbrook Constr. Co. v. Dahne, 254 Md. 443, 255 A.2d 32 (1969);
Buino v. Montgomery County Council, 243 Md. 110, 220 A.2d 126 (1966);
Jobar Corp. v. Rodgers Forge Community Ass'n, 236 Md. 106, 202 A.2d 612
(1964); Rohde v. County Bd. of Appeals, 234 Md. 259, 199 A.2d 216 (1964);
To n of Somerset v. County Council, 229 Md. 42, 181 A.2d 671 (1962); McBee
v. Baltimore County, 221 Md. 312, 157 A.2d 258 (1960). But cf. Miller v.
Abrahams, 239 Md. 263, 211 A.2d 309 (1966); Board of County Comm'rs v.
Meltzer, 239 Md. 144, 210 A.2d 505 (1965); Park Constr. Corp. v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 245 Md. 597, 227 A.2d 15 (1957).
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subject property.66 Finally, the court discusses neither the import of
the planning commission recommendation for the amendment nor
the alleged compliance of the higher use classification sought with
the future land use map,67 despite the fact that these considerations
have been influential in other cases. 68
One difficulty inherent in the Pattey court's interpretation of the
Maryland enabling statute is that it requires the applicant to show
substantial physical change while, in the absence of comprehensive
66. In France v. Shapiro, 248 Md. 335, 236 A.2d 726 (1968), the court of
appeals held invalid the rezoning of certain property on the grounds that there
had been no proof of substantial change, even though the property was adjacent
to two other parcels whose rezoning had previously been upheld upon the same
alleged road improvement. Id. at 343, 236 A.2d at 731; see Beth Tfiloh Con-
gregation v. Blum, 242 Md. 84, 218 A.2d 29 (1966); Finney v. Halle, 241 Md.
224, 216 A.2d 530 (1966). The France court said it did not intend the previous
holdings to be taken as authority for the proposition that all property adjoining
the Baltimore County Beltway, whether or not adversely affected, had undergone
so substantial a change as to be eligible for rezoning. 248 Md. at 343, 236
A.2d at 731. Finney, on its facts, was an extreme case in which the construction
of the Beltway served the property, involved the destruction of the improvements,
and left a tract for which the requested classification was justified. Id. Finney
should be compared with Greenblatt v. Toney Schloss Properties Corp., 235 Md.
9, 200 A.2d 70 (1964), in which a change in access to the subject property
caused solely by the Beltway was held to be insufficient change to support a
reclassification from R-40 to R-20, even though the tract was cut off from other
R-40 property and access could be had only through R-20 property. Id. at
11-14, 200 A.2d at 71-73.
67. The land use plan indicated that the subject property should ultimately
be the site of "non-urban residential development." It was envisioned that this
category would be utilized in the following manner: "Non-Urban Residential
Areas. These include both existing and projected developments of a primarily
single-family residential nature, at such densities as will not require central water
or sewer systems. Not more than 2 dwellings per gross acre can be permitted
safely where individual wells and septic tanks must be relied upon. . . ." 271
Md. at 355, 317 A.2d at 144. The circuit court noted that "the case is one
that is anticipated under the original Comprehensive Master Plan, upon
the occurrence of certain contingencies, and those contingencies have oc-
curred . . . . [The amendment] is found to be nothing more than an extension
of that Plan and an implementation of its stated expectations, purposes and
objectives . . . ." Brief for Appellee at 20, Pattey v. Board of Comm'rs, 271
Md. 352, 317 A.2d 142 (1974).
68. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Board of County Comm'rs, 263 Md. 1, 280
A.2d 901 (1971); Messinger v. Board of County Comm'rs, 259 Md. 693, 271
A.2d 166 (1970); Stephens v. Montgomery County Council, 248 Md. 256, 235
A.2d 701 (1967). But cf. Stratakis v. Beauchamp, 268 Md. 643, 304 A.2d 244
(1973); Heller v. Prince George's County, 264 Md. 410, 286 A.2d 772 (1972);
Habliston v. City of Salisbury, 258 Md. 350, 265 A.2d 885 (1970).
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rezoning, severely restricting the possibilities of such change occurring
in the first place. If a landowner has developed parts of his own tract
according to the existing zoning, his attempt to use that development
as evidence of substantial change in an application to rezone the
remainder to higher density classifications would be open to attack.69
If the developer withstands this challenge and completes a high
density project on the rezoned segment, his attempt to use this as
evidence of change in an application to rezone the remainder may
yet be attacked as "bootstrapping."70 Aside from piecemeal rezoning,
theoretical alternatives to achieve a modification of the existing zon-
ing for a single parcel include the use of variances, special exceptions,
and "floating zones."7' Under the interpretation of the Maryland
courts, none of these alternatives would be available to a landowner
seeking high density development in agricultural or conservation dis-
tricts. Variances may be granted only when literal enforcement of
the ordinances would result in "unnecessary" hardship.7 2 "Floating
zones," construed to be similar to special exceptions, are properly
granted only when the applicant's use would conform to the character
of the neighborhood.73 It appears that neighborhood change, sufficient
to overcome the requirements of the change or mistake rule, can
occur only when building projects are undertaken by the local sanitary
or highway departments7' within the owner's immediate neighbor-
hood. Otherwise, the owner is forced to rely on the passage of a
comprehensive rezoning enactment.1 5
69. See note 62 supra.
70. See MacDonald v. Board of County Comm'rs, 238 Md. 549, 210 A.2d
325 (1965) (changes by applicant within given tract discredited on "bootstrap"
theory).
71. See Carson, supra note 16. See generally MANDELKER, supra note 3, at 53.
72. See, e.g., Carson, supra note 16, at 315.
73. See Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957);
Reno, Non-Euclidean Zoning: The Use of the Floating Zone, 23 1.D. L. Rnv.
105 (1963); cf. Chatham Corp. v. Beltram, 243 Md. 138, 220 A.2d 589 (1966);
Bujno v. County Council, 243 Md. 110, 220 A.2d 126 (1966); Knudsen v.
Montgomery County Council, 241 Md. 436, 217 A.2d 97 (1966); Beall v.
Montgomery County Council, 240 Md. 77, 212 A.2d 751 (1965).
74. See notes 50, 63-64 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of
the influence of highways on land use policy see MANDELKcER, supra note 3, at
95-96.
75. See Zinn v. Board of Appeals, 207 Md. 355, 114 A.2d 614 (1955), in
which the court said:
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The Pattey case illustrates the need for a definitive analysis by the
Maryland courts of how the burden of persuasion is to operate in
cases in which zoning amendments are granted. Absent a repeal of
the change or mistake requirement, the treatment of presumptions
in cases of rezoning grants needs to be distinguished from that taken
in cases of denials to reflect the limitation on local authority discretion
imposed by the rule.76 The West Ridge approach to presumptions
on appeal from rezoning grants, by interpreting this limitation nar-
rowly, supports a localized legislative determination of what types of
changes justify piecemeal revision of existing land use regulations.
One of the primary benefits derived from this approach is flexibility
to deal with both physical development and development in planning
techniques as they occur. The Maryland courts, however, appear to
be moving away from the West Ridge line and towards the Pattey
approach.77
Zoning, of course, looks to the future and is predicated upon an assumed
ability to protect future needs within a narrow range of fallibility. When
it is argued that an unanticipated need has developed, this presupposes
fault in the original plan, that should be ideally corrected by a resurvey of
the land use map, rather than by piecemeal alteration.
Id. at 359, 114 A.2d at 615 (emphasis added).
Zoning changes can, however, be initiated by powers outside of the control
of the local authorities, e.g., state or federal intervention or natural disaster,
but woe be to the applicant who is forced to rely on any of these!
76. See note 28 supra. The recent restatement of this position by the court
of special appeals in Iverson v. Zoning Bd., 22 Md. App. 265, 322 A.2d 569
(1974), may indicate a move towards its acceptance. But see note 57 and accom-
panying text supra.
77. The movement towards the Pattey position is supported by a historical
view of the cases. Compare cases cited note 43 supra, with cases cited notes 32
and 37 supra. Mayor & Council v. Stone, 271 Md. 655, 319 A.2d 536 (1974),
from the West Ridge line of cases, appear' to be an exception to this trend. In
Stone the court states:
[W]e remain mindful of the fact that the rezoning... had to be based on
evidence sufficient to overcome the strong presumption of correctness which is
afforded to comprehensive zoning. . . . Nevertheless, when the evidence
offered convinces the legislative body that either change or mistake is present,
its decision must be sustained by a court on appeal unless it is shown that
this action was arbitrary or capricious because not enough evidence had
been adduced to make the issue "fairly debatable."
271 Md. at 660-61, 319 A.2d at 540 (emphasis added). This language, taken
at face value and in view of the court's result, could be read as a backing off
from the Pattey approach, despite citation of Pattey as support. Id. A return
to the Pattey approach by the court of special appeals in Dustin v. Mayor &
Council, 23 Md. App. 389, 328 A.2d 748 (1974), however, suggests that the
Pattey approach was compromised because the application in Stone was filed by
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The Pattey approach employs standards of review that protect exist-
ing classifications from piecemeal assaults in the name of permanency
and stability by adopting presumptions that favor zoning authorities
when they deny reclassification and protesting neighbors when amend-
ments are granted. The latter result is achieved by painting over the
substantial change requirement with broad strokes of judicial gloss
that limit the boundaries of legislative discretion. As long as the courts
are consistent in the use of this approach, critics who charge usurpa-
tion of the legislative function$ may be directing their attentions
toward the wrong evil, since, in fact, the court's rejection of an
amendment reaffirms the legislative judgments made at the adoption
of the original zoning. Perhaps a more serious problem with the Pattey
approach is that it stifles both flexibility and opportunities for
growth.
79
The Pattey approach suggests that reliance on comprehensive re-
zoning to accomplish zoning alterations will promote stability. The
alternative to flexibility in zoning, however, is not stability. Condi-
tions can and do change more quickly than comprehensive rezoning
can possibly contend with and often in directions which are, at best,
difficult for planners to predict very far in advance. To answer simply
that the original zoning must prevail is both crude and myopic.80
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the City Planning Commission for a less dense classification. 23 Md. App. at
413, 328 A.2d at 763. The court in Stone contends that it has made no such
differentiation. 271 Md. at 661, 319 A.2d at 540.
78. See RATHKOPF, supra note 3, at 21-38 (3d ed. 1974) (contending that the
court of appeals is "constituting itself as a super zoning body").
79. It is debatable whether this is a positive effect. Compare Goldman, supra note
3 (concluding that the change or mistake rule ought to be rejected for a reason-
ableness test), and 24 CATHOLIC U.L. Rav. 294 (1975) (concluding "emphasis
on stability has limited planning flexibility" and "fails to guide local decision-
makers"), with Arnebergh, supra note 3 (concluding that without a high degree
of permanency of zoning, adjacent owner's value and public confidence in
government integrity will be destroyed), and Liebmann, supra note 3, at 51
(concluding that denial of piecemeal reclassifications under the change or mistake
rule will encourage fundamental zoning reforms that are needed to achieve social
ends). For an excellent compilation on the issues, techniques, problems and
trends in the area of management and control of growth see URBAN LAND
INSTITUTE, MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROWTH (R. Scott ed. 1975).
80. See generally I URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF
GROWTH 1-426 (R. Scott ed. 1975).
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